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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellant,
vs.

CaseNo.20040360-SC

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Petitioner/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At issue in this appeal is the interpretation and application of Rule R. 25-14-3(2) of
the Utah Administrative Code, which provides: "All appointed counsel agree to accept as
compensation for the legal services performed and litigation costs incurred the amounts
provided in the Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees found in Section R25-14-4."1
Menzies suggests in his brief that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the
Division does not appeal from a final order. He also argues that the Division of Finance
(the "Division") has failed to apply Utah Administrative Code R. 25-14 (2002) (the

1

While the Division concedes that it has a statutory responsibility to pay for the
costs of persons sentenced to death who pursue post-conviction remedies, it does not
concede that Rule 65C applies to this case or that this case is appropriately subject to the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act. The Division does not challenge, and indeed likely is not
in a position to challenge, however, any previous rulings the trial court may have issued
on the subject.
1

"Rule"), consistently, and that the Rule should not be read literally, but should be
construed to reach the conclusion he favors. Menzies' arguments fail for several reasons.
First, the Division appeals from a final order. The order appealed from resolved
the fee controversy between the parties. The order is on a separate and distinct issue from
the post-conviction case, and although the trial court may retain jurisdiction over any
post-conviction proceedings, the payment issue controversy has been fully resolved as to
all the parties. Accordingly, the Division appeals from a final order.
Second, the Division has applied the Rule to Menzies consistent with its past
interpretation and application. The Division takes the same position here as it has in
virtually every other case: that counsel agree to accept the payments in the Schedule of
Payments of Attorney Fees as payment for attorneys fees and all litigation costs, other
than costs of investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants. The one instance the
Division deviated from this interpretation and application was a mistake; the Division is
not required to be bound by past mistakes in applying the Rule in future circumstances.
Finally, established rules of statutory construction that also apply to administrative
rules require that the Rule be read literally and be applied as written, unless such a
reading is unreasonably inoperable or confused. Because Menzies has not identified how
the Division's interpretation and application of the Rule is unreasonably inoperable or
confused, it must be read literally. When read literally, it is clear that Menzies is not
entitled to separate, additional payments for transcript and printing costs.

2

ARGUMENT
L

THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THIS APPEAL BECAUSE THE
DIVISION APPEALS FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT
COURT.
Menzies first argues that "it is questionable" whether this appeal is taken from a

final order. Appellee's Brief at 1. The order appealed from may not be final, he argues,
because it only resolved some of the issues between all the parties. Id. at 1-2. The Court
does have jurisdiction over this appeal, however, because it is from a final order that
resolved the fee controversy between the relevant parties.
Under the final judgment rule, an appeal is improper if it is taken from an order or
judgment that is not final. Utah R. App. P. 3; Shaw v. Layton Constr. Co., 854 P.2d 1033
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Generally, for a judgment or order to be final it "must dispose of
the case as to all the parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on
the merits of the case." Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 535-36 (Utah
1979). A final order ends the controversy between the parties. Id. "Whether an order is
deemed a 'final order' is not necessarily dependent in all instances upon whether all
issues in a lawsuit have been adjudicated. The test to be applied is a pragmatic test."
First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C. N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 528 (Utah
1979).
The Division appeals from a final order. The order resolved all issues with respect
to payment of fees and costs under the Rule. In addition, the trial court disposed of the

3

merits of the case by denying Menzies relief from summary judgment. Menzies appealed
the order denying relief from summary judgment at virtually the same time the Division
appealed the transcript payment order. No issue in either the post-conviction or transcript
proceedings remained alive. The entire controversy between all of the parties was over.
Accordingly, the Division appeals from a final order.
In any event, Utah recognizes that an order may be final even though the court
retains jurisdiction for other purposes. For example, in child welfare cases, the juvenile
court exercises continuing jurisdiction even though it enters what is considered a final,
appealable order of neglect. See State ex rel EM, 922 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah Ct App.
1996). "Following a neglect adjudication, the juvenile court continues to have
jurisdiction over and periodically reviews the case," even though the neglect adjudication
is a "final factual determination" of the original petition and is appealable. State ex rel
M. W., 2000 UT 79, ^[26, 12 P3d 80 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless,
the juvenile court "retains jurisdiction over the child who is the subject of a neglect,
abuse, or dependency petition to conduct a dispositional review hearing." Id. at ^}26 n.9.
Resolution of the custody petition does not affect the finality of the neglect adjudication
because the petitions are separate and distinct. Id. at f24. Accordingly, the neglect
adjudication would be final and appealable while the trial court retained jurisdiction over

4

the custody petitions.2
Similarly, a district court in divorce proceedings retains continuing jurisdiction to
make subsequent changes or new orders as a result of material changes in circumstances.
See White v. State, 795 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 1990). The result is that several orders in a
single case may be final and appealable. Id An analogous situation also exists in
judgments of contempt. A judgment of criminal contempt is considered to be a final
order separate from ongoing proceedings and appealable as a matter of right. Von Hake
v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1988). Just as a neglect adjudication settles all
factual matters concerning the alleged abuse or neglect, a criminal contempt judgment
settles all factual matters as to the conduct giving rise to an order of contempt.
Although the transcript payment issue is a separate and distinct issue from the
post-conviction proceedings, it did not affect the merits of the post-conviction case, it

2

The related collateral order doctrine provides that an order that finally adjudicates
collateral matters in a case is final and appealable with regard to those collateral matters.
Although when presented with the collateral order doctrine, the Court, so far, has refused
to apply it as an exception to the final judgment rule, this unique case would merit its
application. See Tyler v. Dept of Human Srvcs., 874 P.2d 119, 119 (Utah 1994) (refusing
the apply the collateral order doctrine to allow an appeal of an order of the district court
compelling discovery) The collateral order doctrine was first applied by the United States
Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). The
Cohen court held that, in a "small class [of orders] which finally determine claims of right
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied
review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated" may be considered "final" for purposes of
appeal. Given that the statute requires the Division to pay for costs of appeal, it is
imperative to get a ruling clarifying the Division's full payment responsibilities under the
Rule before an appeal on the merits is concluded.
5

resolved the claims of the parties as to the payment of transcripts, and is a final,
appealable order just as in child welfare, divorce, and criminal contempt proceedings.
Even though the trial court may have continuing jurisdiction to issue orders in certain
aspects of the post-conviction case, the transcript payment order is final and appealable
because it resolved the separate and distinct fee controversy. The transcript payment
order contemplated no further action in the case and in this respect is final.
Menzies argues, nonetheless, that the Division has continued to litigate the case in
the trial court since entry of the order. Appellee's Brief at 2, n.l. He points specifically
to the Division's objection to his request for transcripts and designation of record, and a
motion, filed by Menzies himself, for extraordinary payment of counsel pursuant to Utah
Administrative Code R. 25-14-4(6). Id. Neither action, however, changed the finality of
the transcript payment order.
The Division's objection to Menzies' request for transcripts and designation of
record is related solely to the appeal, and absent an appeal even being filed, would not be
at issue. The State filed a similar objection in the post-conviction appeal that was ruled
on by the Court. See Appellant's Brief at Appendix "B." It is illogical that an order that
is otherwise final can somehow be converted to a non-final order, and therefore nonappealable, because of issues that may arise during the appeal and that are related solely
to the appeal.
Similarly, Menzies' motion for extraordinary payment of counsel does not affect

6

the finality of the order appealed from here. All controversy over the payment of fees and
costs was resolved by the trial court's order requiring the Division to pay for transcripts.
At the time appeals were filed, there was no live issue on this topic remaining in the
district court.
The Rule does provide for additional payment of fees if the district court finds
"that the appointed counsel provided extraordinary legal services that were not reasonably
foreseeable at the time of accepting the appointment... ." Utah Admin. Code R. 25-144(6)(b)(l) (2002). The extraordinary payment of fees may be made at any time the Rule's
requirements are met, including after the filing of an appeal. Counsel does not, however,
have a right to nor an expectation of extraordinary payment of fees.
Menzies' argument, if accepted, would allow a post-conviction petitioner to, in
essence, convert a final order that is otherwise appealable into a non-final order that
deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction. Menzies' arguments would allow a petitioner
to play with the final judgment rule to effectively prohibit any appeals on this issue. The
Division would face an impossible choice: either file an appeal of an order under the Rule
to preserve its appeal rights with the hope that a petitioner does not move for
extraordinary payment of fees, and thereby deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction, or
wait to file an appeal and hope that petitioner files a motion for extraordinary payment of
fees. In the event no motion for extraordinary payment is filed, the Division would then
lose its appeal rights for not filing a notice within the proper time of entry of a final,

7

appealable order. Certainly this absurd result is not one intended by the final judgment
rule.3
In short, the order appealed from here is a final order. The order resolved the fee
controversy between the parties, and is on a separate and distinct issue that does not affect
the merits of the case.
II.

THE DIVISION'S PRIOR ADMINISTRATION AND APPLICATION OF
ITS ADMINISTRATIVE RULE HAS BEEN CONSISTENT AND IS
CONSISTENT WITH ITS ACTIONS IN THIS CASE.
Menzies argues that the Division's interpretation and application of the Rule

should be accorded no deference because it has inconsistently applied the Rule.
Appellee's Brief at 17-24. State agencies are generally given "considerable latitude of
discretion in deciding what policies will best carry out the responsibilities imposed upon
it." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd, 403 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1965). In fact, an
administrative interpretation and application of a statute "is generally regarded as prima
facie correct and not to be overturned so long as it is in conformity with the general
objectives the agency is charged with carrying out, and there is a rational basis for it in
the provisions of law." Id,

3

Nonetheless, to prevent such an absurd result, this case would fit within the
"extraordinary cases exception" to the final judgment rule. Under the extraordinary cases
exception, the Court "may choose to treat a purported [appellate rule 3 appeal of right] as
an interlocutory appeal under [appellate rule 5]." A. J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr,
Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991) (quoting Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806, 808
(Utah 1986)).
8

While an agency has an obligation to consistently apply its rules, the Division is
not required "to be bound in future circumstances by past mistakes." Williams v. Public
Serv. Comm Vz, 754 P.2d 41, 52 (Utah 1988). The notion that an administrative agency is
bound to follow past mistakes, the Court has ruled, is "unacceptable." Id.
The Williams decision is instructive. In Williams, plaintiff appealed the Public
Service Commission's (the "PSC") denial of his application for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity. Plaintiff argued that the PSC improperly and arbitrarily
reversed its long-standing policy of regulation of one-way paging services by changing its
administrative rule. After agreeing that the PSC's interpretation of the statute was
rational and reasonably based, the court pointed out that plaintiffs position that the PSC
did have jurisdiction over one-way paging "would require the PSC to be bound in future
circumstances by past mistakes." Id. at 50 (citing Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 403
P.2d 781, 784 (1965)) An analysis, the court, deemed "unacceptable." Id. The court
concluded that the PSC "is not prevented from reversing its previous practice of
exercising jurisdiction over one-way paging services." Id; see also Colman, 403 P.2d at
784 (holding that "deviation from proper procedure in prior cases would not commit [an
agency] irrevocably to continue doing so [, a]nd it certainly would give the plaintiff no
right to compel persistence in such impropriety").
Of all the payments that have been made over the past several years in postconviction cases, Menzies points to only one instance, over two years ago, where the

9

Division actually paid two bills for "transcript expenses." See Appellee's Brief,
Appendix at 003851-003856. This amounts to nothing more than a single oversight by
the Division, not a pattern of inconsistent application. Menzies points to no other
instance where the Division has separately paid for transcript expenses.
Menzies also points to an electronic mail message from a Division employee to
Menzies' legal counsel to show inconsistent application of the Rule. The message,
however, does nothing to support his argument. The message simply states that if
Menzies' legal counsel was to get a court order, the Division "should be able to pay [an
invoice for transcripts]." Appellee's Appendix at 003857. The e-mail only shows that
the Division would consider payment. It never did separately pay for that expense. In
short, the Division is not bound to apply the Rule in future circumstances consistent with
a single mistake made over two years ago. Rather, the Division has applied the Rule
consistent with its interpretation in this case.
III.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MUST BE INTERPRETED LITERALLY
AND BE HELD TO MEAN WHAT IT SAYS.
Menzies does not disagree that the Division's interpretation of its rule is correct.

Rather, he argues that the rule cannot "be read literally as the final word on the issue . . .
." Appellee's Brief at 21. He urges the Court to harmonize the rule and other legal
provisions to "insure that qualified counsel are given adequate compensation for
representing capital clients in state post-conviction proceedings, and that reasonable

10

litigation expenses are paid from state funds by the Division of Finance."4 Id
Administrative rules, like statutes, should generally be construed according to their
plain language. Archer v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah
1995) (using rules of statutory construction in construing administrative rules). Thus, in
reviewing a statute or administrative rule, courts are to "read each term literally unless
such a reading is unreasonably inoperable or confused." Id. In construing a statute, as
well as an administrative rule, the Court has repeatedly recognized that:
We need look beyond the plain language only if we find some ambiguity.... In
analyzing a statute's plain language, we must attempt to give each part of the
provision a relevant and independent meaning so as to give effect to all of its
terms. . . . However, if we find a provision that causes doubt or uncertainty in its
application, we must analyze the act in its entirety and harmonize its provisions in
accordance with the legislative intent and purpose... . Nevertheless, a statute's
unambiguous language may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning.
State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, f 25, 4 P.3d 795 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see
also Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 55,1J17 & n.5, 5 P.3d 616 (recognizing the duty of an
appellate court to "avoid interpreting a statute in a manner that renders portions of the

4

Although Menzies agrees that the amount of the payments provided in the Rule is
not before the Court in this appeal, the payment amounts appear to form the sole basis for
his argument. He asks the Court to overlook the plain language and read the Rule to
"insure that qualified counsel are given adequate compensation for representing capital
clients in state post-conviction proceedings, and that reasonable litigation expenses are
paid from state funds by the Division fo Finance." Appellee's Brief at pg. 21. The Court
generally does not rule on issues not properly before it. See State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108,
T[l 1, 992 P.2d 986 (expressly reserving judgment on an issue not properly before the
Court). The issue of the payment amounts is not properly before the Court because
Menzies has not followed the required statutory and administrative procedures to amend
an administrative rule. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (West 2004).
11

statute, or related statutes, meaningless"). Applying these principles to the Rule
establishes that the payments pursuant to the Rule's Schedule of Payment of Attorneys
Fees is for both legal services performed and litigation costs incurred.
The Rule provides that appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings "agree to
accept as full compensation for the legal services performed and the litigation costs
incurred the amounts provided in the Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees found in
R25-14-4." Utah Admin. Code R. 25-14-3(2) (2002). Menzies has failed to show that a
literal interpretation of the Rule is unreasonably inoperable, confused or ambiguous. A
literal interpretation of the Rule and the Division's application is in harmony with the
statute because it provides payment for the two expenses expressly enumerated in the
statute: costs of counsel and reasonable litigation expenses.
The Rule's provision for payment of expert witnesses, consultants, and
investigators is equally unambiguous when read literally. The Rule provides that the
Division "shall pay reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed a total of $20,000.00 in
any one case for court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants." Utah
Admin. Code R. 25-14-5 (2002). The list of covered expenses is exclusive and does not,
by the Rule's plain terms, include payment for transcripts, printing, copying, or other
ordinary litigation expenses. This part of the Rule is not ambiguous, nor is it
unreasonably inoperable or confused.
Finally, Menzies argues that the Division has "substantial leeway to apply or

12

ignore one or the other element [sic] of the rule in any given case." Appellee's Brief at
23. The Rule is clear, however, as to when the Division is required to make any payment
and in what amount.5 The Rule allows the Division no discretion because it is either
bound by the Rule's terms or a court order requiring payment. See Utah Admin. Code R.
25-14-4(6)(b) (2002) (requiring a district court order for payment of extraordinary legal
services). Similarly, legal counsel can read the Rule and know, before accepting
appointment, what amounts will be paid and when those payments will be made. Legal
counsel know what funds are available and they are then given the discretion on how to
use those fluids to best present a petitioner's case. The Division administers the Rule's
payment provisions only; it does not make value based decisions on expenses. In this
respect, a literal interpretation and application of the Rule virtually requires the Division
to consistently apply the Rule.

5

Menzies alternatively argues that the District Attorney's Office or Respondent
should be required to provide and pay for the transcripts. The Division accepts its
statutory responsibility to pay fees and costs in post-conviction cases. If the Court rules
in the Division's favor, then Menzies has already received payment for copying, printing,
and transcript costs. If the Court rules in Menzies' favor, then the Division is responsible
for paying these costs from the $20,000 fund for investigators. Regardless, Menzies has
no claim against either the County or Respondent for copying, printing, and transcript
costs for his post-conviction case.
13

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court should vacate the trial court's order and remand
for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J>

day of February, 2005.

JOEy A. FERRE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Appellant, Division of Finance
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this Cr^

day of February, 2005,1 mailed, first-class

postage prepaid, two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to6:
Elizabeth Hunt L.L.C.
Elizabeth Hunt
569 Browning Ave.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
and caused to be hand delivered a copy to:
Thomas Brunker
Utah Attorney General's Office
160 E 300 S, 6*^1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

6

Menzies' counsel complains that she received a copy of the Division's brief late
because it was mailed to the wrong address. Menzies' counsel apparently has had several
different addresses during the course of this appeal, yet has failed to routinely informed
Division's counsel of those changes of address. The Division mailed a copy of its brief to
the last known address it had for Menzies' legal counsel
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